Eine der Spezifitäten des rothbardschen Systems dass er letztlich "naturrechtlich" abgeleitete Eigentumsrechte über freiwillige Vereinbarungen stellt:
"The right of property implies the right to make contracts about that
property: to give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the
property of another person. Unfortunately, many libertarians, devoted to
the right to make contracts, hold the contract itself to be an absolute, and therefore maintain that any
voluntary contract whatever must be legally enforceable in the free
society. Their error is a failure to realize that the right to contract
is strictly derivable from the right of private property, and therefore
that the only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the
sanction of legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one
party to abide by the contract implies the theft of property
from the other party. In short, a contract should only be enforceable
when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. But
this can only be true if we hold that validly enforceable contracts only
exist where title to property has already been transferred,
and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means that the
other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without the
consent of the former (implicit theft). Hence, this proper libertarian
theory of enforceable contracts has been termed the “title-transfer”
theory of contracts. (...)"
(aus The ethics of liberty, Kapitel 19: "Property rights and the theory of contracts")
Woraus Rothbard ableitet, was alles in einer libertären Rechtsordnung verboten - da illegitim - sind, etwa fractional reserve banking, GmbHs oder Bankrottregelungen.
Hierzu schreibt der Panarchist Adam Knott, meines Erachtens zu Recht:
"Rothbard, C, is saying to two people, A and B: Here is what you are
allowed to do between yourselves, and here is what you are not allowed to
do between yourselves. This is my natural law system, that is absolute,
immutable, and of universal validity for all times and places...
Therefore, you, A and B, cannot do such and such between yourselves. You
can only do what my system says.
Rothbard's point might be that then, A and B could do something that would spill over and effect person C. But my point is that this is why C has a government, to protect his (C's) rights. So for the cases of conflicting value systems or overlapping jurisdictions, the governments of A and B, and of C, have to arrive at some solution.
Rothbard is saying: No, the solution is for A and B to belong to the Rothbardian society !
Question: Will this be by force, or by voluntary consent of A and B ?
I think that part of the problem is that the Rothbardian school of libertarianism bases its concept of liberty on property. But others base their concept of liberty on voluntary consent. Thus, the Rothbardian system ends up contradicting voluntary consent, because it arrives at an abstract conception of property that is based on a specific individual's theory, and considers as invalid a priori, any property arrangements at variance with the theory, even if voluntarily chosen by the individuals concerned. It also considers as invalid a priori, alternative or rival theories of property. Implicit in the private property ethicist's theory of property is the implication that the core property theory of the philosopher and his students is more important than voluntary consent, and more important than the property relations accepted by other individuals amongst themselves. The private property ethicist's theory of property does not allow voluntary consent in regard to property, nor does it allow alternative theories of property. The private property ethic is considered by its adherents to be 'absolute, immutable, and of universal validity for all times and places'."
Rothbard's point might be that then, A and B could do something that would spill over and effect person C. But my point is that this is why C has a government, to protect his (C's) rights. So for the cases of conflicting value systems or overlapping jurisdictions, the governments of A and B, and of C, have to arrive at some solution.
Rothbard is saying: No, the solution is for A and B to belong to the Rothbardian society !
Question: Will this be by force, or by voluntary consent of A and B ?
I think that part of the problem is that the Rothbardian school of libertarianism bases its concept of liberty on property. But others base their concept of liberty on voluntary consent. Thus, the Rothbardian system ends up contradicting voluntary consent, because it arrives at an abstract conception of property that is based on a specific individual's theory, and considers as invalid a priori, any property arrangements at variance with the theory, even if voluntarily chosen by the individuals concerned. It also considers as invalid a priori, alternative or rival theories of property. Implicit in the private property ethicist's theory of property is the implication that the core property theory of the philosopher and his students is more important than voluntary consent, and more important than the property relations accepted by other individuals amongst themselves. The private property ethicist's theory of property does not allow voluntary consent in regard to property, nor does it allow alternative theories of property. The private property ethic is considered by its adherents to be 'absolute, immutable, and of universal validity for all times and places'."
(with thanks to the author Adam Knott, and to Christian Butterbach for the text and backchecking with Adam!)
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